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            BALANCING SEA DUTY WITH ASSIGNMENT  






 The goal of sea pay has always been to motivate sailors to go to sea and to 
compensate the arduous nature of sea duty.  This study will take sea pay one step further 
by analyzing sea pay as a location incentive pay. By offering a premium to sailors who 
choose less desirable sea duty locations, we hope to motivate more sailors to volunteer 
for these locations. This study will use data from the current location assignment 
incentive pay for overseas locations and the sea pay history to determine the reaction of 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
Some sea duty billets are more desirable than others.   
It is recognized that members do not view all assignments as equally 
desirable.  This can be attributed to factors such as the geographic 
location, type of job, or nature of the duty.  The distribution process 
attempts to fill all the assignments regardless of desirability, but because 
of the natural dynamics of the process, less desirable assignments are more 
difficult to fill.1   
Detailers distribute people throughout the Navy in accordance with the needs of the 
Navy.  The detailer’s job is controlled by the available billets.  Individual sailors have to 
choose from the billets available at the time they are open for orders.  If the sailor’s 
number one location is not available, the sailor must choose an alternate with no added 
incentive.  The detailer can not offer the sailor any additional compensation for going to a 
location he or she does not want.  The needs of the Navy will always prevail.   
The Navy would like to change the distribution process to make it more flexible 
and reduce the number of sailors that are involuntarily assigned.  Billets available will not 
change and the detailers will still be required to fill all billets.  Changing the desirability 
of billets is one way to reduce the number of involuntarily assigned sailors.  Since the 
arduous nature of sea duty is similar aboard all ships and the type of job an individual 
will do onboard a ship will be similar for any individual, location is the most likely cause 
for inequality of sea duty billets.  The Navy can change monetary compensation for sea 
duty locations.  Changing monetary compensation for locations may neutralize the 
desirability of all sea duty billets.  
 
B. PURPOSE 
The goal of this paper is to analyze possible pay systems that would produce at 
least one volunteer for every sea duty billet.  Changing pay systems by location of 
                                                 
1 NPC Web Site-Assignment Incentive Pay – Business Rules p. 1 
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assignment should establish neutral desirability.  The analysis includes the cost of the 
systems and cost savings due to better retention.  To increase retention and create a 
volunteer for every sea duty billet, the pay system will have to reflect the desirability of 
each billet.   
The pay systems looked at includes Sea Pay, and Assignment Incentive Pay, to 
determine which system will have the greatest effect on the assignment system.  
Additional pay may create a volunteer for every sea duty billet.  The systems adjust pay 
by location desirability in an attempt to balance sea duty preference.  This analysis tries 
to determine the cost of each system to the Navy and then recommend the most efficient 
and effective system.   
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Research Questions: 
• Can additional pay influence sailors to volunteer for less desirable billet 
locations?   
• What would it cost the Navy to produce a volunteer for every sea duty 
billet?   
• What would the savings be if there were higher retention rates?   




The Scope includes: 
• A brief history and the goal of the sea pay system.  
• Description of the current pay system. 
• Review of the influence of sea pay on the decisions of the sailors.   
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• Sea pay as a location incentive pay system.  The change required to make 
this work and the effect on the overall sea pay system.   
• The cost of such a system and the cost to create a volunteer for every sea 
duty billet.  
• Types of auctions and auction designs in the assignment incentive pay 
system foundation.  
• The Assignment Incentive Pay system and its possible use as a location 
incentive for sea duty.  
• The Sea Duty Location Assignment Incentive Pay (SDLAIP) system costs 
are estimated.  
•  Conclusions, recommendations and areas for further research.  
  
E. ORGANIZATION 
The report is divided into four chapters.  The first chapter is about sea pay, 
providing a brief background including the current program and discussion of how the 
current program would be changed to provide the desired outcome.  The impact and 
effect of the changes are reviewed.   
The assignment incentive pay chapter discusses forward and reverse auction 
theory.  Then, it briefly highlights the background of the current assignment incentive 
pay system.  This chapter also explains auction design and the reason for the Navy’s 
choice of design.  Different ways to use the Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) system are 
discussed.  The system is used as a separate location pay added to the current sea pay 
system and is also looked at as an assignment incentive pay as a percentage of current sea 
pay.   
The third chapter discuses cost savings and expenses of the three different 
applications of the two systems.  The cost of not changing the system is addressed and 
then compared with the cost of instituting one of the new systems.  The savings from 
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implementing the new systems is compared to determine which system is most cost 
effective.  
The final chapter of the report is the conclusions, recommendations and areas for 
further research.  The conclusions chapter reviews hard points that the research was 
unable to answer or tackle at this stage.  Recommendations are made based on the 
research that was conducted.  The recommendations are consistent with creating a 
balance in the distribution system.  Areas for further research are suggested to increase 
the accuracy of this research.  Further research is needed in the areas that were beyond 
the scope of this research.  
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II. SEA PAY  
A. BACKGROUND  
Sea pay is a form of pay given to sailors assigned to ships.  Sailors have received 
this extra pay as added incentive for the arduous conditions of sea duty.  Serving at sea is 
hard work and sailors have grown to expect extra pay for the responsibility.  
Sea pay has a long history.  Its beginning can be traced back to the 1800s when 
sailors were only paid while attached to a ship.  When they took leave to go ashore, they 
did not receive pay.  This is said to be the real start of sea pay.2  
Most recently, though, sea pay has been given to sailors attached to ships as an 
addition to their normal pay and benefits.  The current sea pay system increases the 
amount of money an individual will receive according to the amount of sea time the 
person has served.  The more experienced the sailors, the more sea pay they receive. In 
its current state, sea pay has no impact on the sailors’ duty assignment.  They have a set 
sea-shore rotation and when it is time to go to sea, they know they will get sea pay no 
matter what sea duty assignment is given. 
 
B. CURRENT PROGRAM 
1. Sea Pay, Current use and Goals   
Sea pay rewards cumulative sea duty.  The more sea going experience an 
individual has, the more money they will make while on sea duty.  The sea pay system 
recognizes experience and provides an incentive for personnel to stay on sea duty longer.  
A sea pay premium of $100 per month was instituted to motivate first term sailors to 
complete their first sea tours at higher rates.  First term sailors, typically, join the Navy 
for an initial four year enlistment.  They start out at boot camp and, usually, attend an 
enlisted ‘A’ school before being assigned to a ship.  By the time they get to their first 
ship, they have between six months and one year of active duty.  The initial sea duty 
assignment is four years for most sailors, so, there is a mismatch between the sailors End 
                                                 
2 Golding, H. and McArther, S. “Navy Sea Pay: History and Recent Initiatives”.  
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of Active Obligated Service (EAOS) and the Projected Rotation Date (PRD).  For sailors 
to finish their first sea duty assignment, they have to reenlist or extend on active duty.  
Sea pay has been adjusted to provide the proper incentive to get these sailors to extend. 
The system and rates being used now have provided the Navy with the outcome 
the system was designed to create.  More first term sailors complete their sea duty than 
before the system was changed.  Some even stay on sea duty longer than their prescribed 
sea tours.  This creates a more experienced work force at sea.  As seen in Table 1, the sea 
pay table increases as pay grade increases and time served on sea duty increases.   
 
Table 1.   Sea Pay Table 
 Years of cumulative sea duty 
Paygrade < 1 > 1 > 2 > 3 > 4 > 5 > 6 > 7 … > 18 
E-1 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 … 50 
E-2 50 60 75 75 75 75 75 75 … 75 
E-3 50 60 100 100 100 100 100 100 … 100 
E-4 70 80 160 280 290 290 290 290 … 390 
E-5 70 80 160 280 300 315 325 350 … 450 
E-6 135 135 160 280 300 315 325 350 … 550 
E-7 135 135 160 305 320 350 350 375 … 600 
E-8/E-9 135 135 160 305 320 350 350 375 … 620 
a. Career Sea Pay Premium eligibility extended for all sailors under 8 years of cumulative sea duty, 
whereupon the additional pay becomes embedded in the sea pay table. (additional pay equals $100 per 
month) 
 
2. Sea Pay’s Influence on Sailors’ Decisions 
Sea pay does influence sailors’ decisions; but, how much?  In one study, the 
statistical analysis concluded that for every $50 increase in sea pay 2.9 percent of sailors 
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extended on sea duty.3  This indicates that sailors will continue to stay on less desired 
duty for more money.  The arduous nature of sea duty creates a need to provide 
incentives for sailors to volunteer for this duty.  It also provides incentives to extend on 
sea duty.  
Sea pay is the incentive package that allows the Navy to fill some sea duty billets 
through voluntarily extensions on sea duty.  Without these voluntary extensions, the 
billets would be vacated earlier than originally anticipated and the Navy would have to 
fill them.  More sailors are staying after the three year point due to the increase in sea pay 
associated with the sea pay premium.  This helps the Navy by reducing the demand for 
new sailors at sea.  The increased retention of sailors on sea duty has a direct impact on 
the demand placed on the recruiting community.  By reducing this demand, the Navy 
saves money. 
 
C. COST TO USE SEA PAY AS LOCATION INCENTIVE PAY 
1. Sea Pay as a Location Incentive Pay 
We have seen that sea pay can influence sailors’ decisions.  Now, how do we 
modify the sea pay system to continue to influence sailors to stay on sea duty and to 
choose the home port locations that are less desirable?  First, this requires a look at where 
the sea duty locations are; how many billets are available in those locations; and, the 
desirability of the locations.    
Initially all surface ships were accounted for and home port locations were 
determined.  Each ship’s crew size was determined from published data on the United 
States Navy’s fact file web site.4  Total billets per location were determined from this 
data and then an interview was conducted with an Electrician Mate (EM) detailer to 
determine desirability of locations.  The interview was conducted using pair wise 
comparisons of all duty locations.  The EM detailer was chosen because this rate has 
                                                 
3 Golding, Heidi L. W. and Gregory, David Sailors’ “Willingness to Complete Sea Tours: Does 
Money Matter?” p. 34. 
4 United States Navy fact file web site www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/ffiletop.html   15 Nov, 
2005 
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personnel on every ship in the Navy at about the same rate per ship.  The Detailer was 
asked to provide the easiest to fill location when given two locations.  When two 
locations were compared the easiest to fill location was given a one and the other a zero.  
For example, in the table below, when Everett/Bremerton was compared to Ingleside; 
Everett/Bremerton was given a one and Ingleside a zero.  When summed at the bottom of 
the table, each location had a desirability score.  The highest score indicates the most 
desirable location.  Likewise, the lowest score indicates the least desirable location.   
 
Table 2.   Pair Wise Comparison for E-1 to E-5 




















, CA Japan 
Everett / 
Bremerton, 
WA   0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
Ingleside, 
TX 1   1 1 1 1 1 1 
Mayport, FL 0 0   0 0 0 1 1 
Norfolk / 
Little Creek, 
VA 0 0 1   0 1 1 1 
Pascagoula, 
MS 1 0 1 1   1 1 1 
Pearl 
Harbor, HI 0 0 1 0 0   1 0 
San Diego, 
CA 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 
Japan 1 0 0 0 0 1 1   
Desirability  3 0 5 3 1 5 7 4 
 
In the initial part of the interview, the Detailer indicated that there are basically 
two types of individuals; junior and senior.  The junior personnel are young, typically 
first term sailors, not married that want to travel; the senior personnel are typically 
married and prefer to stay in one location.  The interview separated the two groups for the 
pair wise comparison.  The two outcomes were combined with equal value given to each 
group.  The equal value given to each group is an estimate based on the fact that the 
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dividing point is about when people get married; about 50 percent of the enlisted force is 
married.   
From the pair wise comparison table it was assumed that the two middle locations 
are neutral and the three highest scoring locations are the most desirable and neither 
requires added incentive to be ordered to the locations.  The three least desirable 
locations require incentive pay at different amounts.  These amounts were determined by 
an estimated percent of people per location.  For simplicity it was assumed that the least 
desirable location would have a deficit of 1 percent of the total population that would 
prefer to go to the most desired location.  The second least desired location would have a 
deficit of .67 percent that would prefer to go to the second most desired location and the 
third least desired location would have a deficit of .33 percent that would prefer to go to 
the third most desired location.  The opposite is true for the three most desirable 
locations, with positive values of 1.00, 0.67 and 0.33 percent respectively.  From this the 
following table was produced.  









WA -0.33% 0.00% -0.33% 
Ingleside, TX -1.00% -0.33% -1.33% 
Mayport, FL 0.67% 0.67% 1.33% 
Norfolk/Little Creek, 
VA 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Pascagoula, MS -0.67% 0.33% -0.33% 
Pearl Harbor, HI 0.33% -0.67% -0.33% 
San Diego, CA 1.00% 1.00% 2.00% 
Japan 0.00% -1.00% -1.00% 
 
The percent location requested block in the Table 4 below is the outcome of the 
data in Table 3.    Table 4 provides the number of billets per location and the total Navy 
wide.  Some of the locations in Table 4 were not included in the pair wise comparison 
due to one of two factors.  La Maddalena and Guam are considered neutral because they 
are already in the Assignment Incentive Pay program.  Gaita, Italy has such a small 
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number of billets that it is considered neutral.  Otherwise, Table 4 provides all of the 
results used to compute the cost of adjusting sea pay for an incentive location pay. 
 
Table 4.   Represents the number of billets per sea duty location and percent of 











Everett/Bremerton, WA 6718 7.42% 7.09% -0.33% 
Gaeta, Italy 790 0.87% 0.87% 0.00% 
Guam 1266 1.40% 1.40% 0.00% 
Ingleside, TX 1464 1.62% 0.29% -1.33% 
La Maddalena, Italy 1266 1.40% 1.40% 0.00% 
Mayport, FL 7275 8.04% 9.37% 1.33% 
Norfolk/Little Creek, VA 37153 41.05% 41.05% 0.00% 
Pascagoula, MS 736 0.81% 0.48% -0.33% 
Pearl Harbor, HI 3010 3.33% 3.00% -0.33% 
San Deigo, CA 22462 24.82% 26.82% 2.00% 
Japan 8367 9.24% 8.24% -1.00% 
Total billets 90507 100.00% 100.00%  
* Percent is an estimate based on author’s interview with EM rating detailer.   
 
The main issue is not whether one location is less desirable than another location, 
but whether locations are as desirable as the number of billets available in each location.  
There needs to be a balance of desirability with the number of billets available throughout 
the Navy.  Take Ingleside for example; with the desirability premium of -1.3 percent, 
Ingleside would require detailers to slam a person into a billet because too few sailors 
will volunteer.  Is this because Ingleside is less desirable than most other locations, or 
because it is not desirable to 1.6 percent of the Navy enlisted force?  Every billet in 
Ingleside does not require detailers to slam people into them.  The issue is that detailers 
have more billets available in Ingleside than they have people requesting to go to 
Ingleside.  Ingleside has 1.6 percent of all sea duty billets, but less than 1.6 percent of the 
personnel want to go to Ingleside.  To create neutrality, the number of people requesting 
a location must be the same as the number of billets available in that location.  The 
question is: Can sea pay be modified to create neutrality among all of the sea duty 
locations?   
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 Assume that all sailors realize they are going to have to go to sea duty 
somewhere and are willing to volunteer for orders to at least one location.  Money can 
influence their willingness to stay on sea duty longer, so it should have an impact on their 
location preference.  Assume that every $50 extra per month a location can pay has a 
similar effect as with extensions on sea duty; for every increase of $50 per month in sea 
pay for a location, one third of one percent of Navy personnel will change their 
preference to that location.  This removes the type of ship and age of ship as factors in 
sailors’ decisions.  Based on the Table 4 information for desirability premium, Table 5 
shows the required cost increase for each of the less desirable locations.  
The sea pay changes would have no negative effect on the current sea pay system.  
The changes would create a volunteer for every billet available.  No sailors would have to 
be slammed into a billet.  The increase in pay would be enough to satisfy the sailors 
throughout their tour of duty.  Sea pay would still influence sailors to extend on sea duty 
to complete their tours.  Therefore, completion rates would remain the same and possibly 
increase due to sailors not having to be slammed into billets.  
Table 5.   Represents the cost of increasing sea pay to balance the number of billets 







Same Sea Pay for All 
Sailors 
Everett/Bremerton, WA 6718 $50 $4,030,800 
Gaeta, Italy 790    
Guam 1266    
Ingleside, TX 1464 $200 $3,513,600 
La Maddalena, Italy 1266    
Mayport, FL 7275    
Norfolk/Little Creek, VA 37153    
Pascagoula, MS 736 $50 $441,600 
Pearl Harbor, HI 3010 $50 $1,806,000 
San Deigo, CA 22462    
Japan 8367 $150 $15,060,600 
 Total 90507   $24,852,600 
However, this would not create neutrality among all sea duty billets.  This model 
presumes that the balance was automatically obtained by providing extra money to the 
less desirable billets.  There may still be a problem with the model.  What if you now 
have less people requesting Mayport than you have billets?   The analysis presented here 
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is based on a basic understanding of how money could influence sailors to voluntarily fill 
all sea duty billets in the Navy.  
The concept is simplified in order to make generalizations, holding other 
unknown variables fixed.  These variables are class of ship and age of ship preference, 
coast preference and job preference.  There are also other factors that will influence 
sailors’ decisions, such as, willingness to move and desire to travel.  This project holds all 
variables fixed, while changing monetary compensation in order to determine the impact 
and feasibility of offering more money for less desirable billets.  This model leaves very 
little room for error.  The model has no flexibility, therefore, the next chapter will look at 
auctions as a possible monetary compensation system to alleviate the sea duty preference 
problem.  
This system does not guarantee a volunteer for each billet, and may produce more 
than one volunteer for each billet.  The market clearing price is not known for every 
location, therefore, the price that is set may be too high, producing several volunteers for 
a location, or too low, not producing enough volunteers for a location.  Also, it provides 
sailors all the surplus value by paying everyone the cost to attract the marginal sailor.  
This is equitable, in that all sailors receive the same pay, but some will receive far more 
surplus value than others, and surplus to sailors is at the Navy’s expense.  The Navy 
needs to capture some of this surplus value while creating a volunteer for each billet.  
Auctions can provide a means to attract a volunteer for each billet and transfer some of 





III. SEA DUTY LOCATION ASSIGNMENT INCENTIVE PAY  
A. TYPES OF AUCTIONS  
1. Forward Auction Theory 
Auctions differ depending on the number of buyers and sellers.  This information 
will determine the design of the auction.  There are many designs which try to create the 
highest or lowest price for the person conducting the auction.   
The most popular auction is the English forward auction.  This is when one 
person has an item for sale and there are many potential buyers.  The auctioneer 
continues to raise the price until only one buyer is left bidding.  All the winning bidder 
has to do is bid one level higher than the next highest bidder’s reservation price.5  “Thus 
the winner earns a profit:  the winner pays less than the item is worth to him or her 
(because generally there will be a gap between the second-highest valuation and the 
highest valuation).”6  As long as the maximum bid is over the seller’s reserve price, he 
will receive surplus value from the sale.7    Any bid between the seller’s reserve price and 
the winning bidder’s reservation price will produce surplus value to both the seller and 
bidder.  
The Dutch Forward auction may be used when there is one seller and few 
potential buyers.  With this style, the auctioneer starts with a price that is well over the 
reservation price of any of the potential bidders.  As the price comes down, the bidder 
with the highest reservation price will presumably bid first and win.  This style attempts 
to capture more surplus from the highest bidder.  The highest bidder will try to estimate 
the other bidders’ values and insure that he bids before they will.  As long as the bid is 
over the seller’s reserve price the seller will perceive surplus value from the sale.  The 
bidder will receive surplus value that he or she was willing to except by bidding a 
predetermined amount under their reservation price.   
                                                 
5  Reservation price is the maximum price a bidder is willing to pay for an item. 
6 McMillan, John.  “Games Stratecies and Managers”  p. 136 
7  Reserve price is the minimum price a seller is willing to take for the item. 
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First price sealed bid auctions are used to try to capture the maximum reservation 
price.  The sealed bids are submitted during a specified time period and then they are all 
opened at the same time and the highest bid wins.  This does not always generate the 
maximum price outcome desired.  Some people shy away from sealed bid auctions or 
they don’t actually bid their maximum reservation price by trying to guess what the other 
person’s maximum reservation price is and bidding just over that amount.  One way to 
insure that everyone bids their own maximum reservation price is the second price sealed 
bid auction.  With this method, all the bids are collected and the highest bidder wins, but 
only has to pay the second highest price bid for the item.  The optimum strategy is for 
each bidder to bid their true reservation price.  This implies all bids are at their 










1 2 3 4 5 6
Bidders
 
Figure 1.   Auction bidding scenario. 
 
Figure 1 shows the results from the different auction formats.  A second price 
sealed bid auctions and English auction where everyone is paid the closing bid, the only 
workable solution for multi-item auctions gives you a result equivalent to the horizontal 
red line; everyone receives sea pay of 200 dollars.  A first price sealed bid auction, where 
everyone is paid their bid would produce the diagonal blue line or the stair steps 
depending on the bid increments if everyone bids their reservation price.  However, with 
a multi-item auction, bidders are not likely to bid their reservation price.  In fact, 
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everyone will try to guess where the closing bid will fall (i.e. the diagonal blue line), and 
bid that.  With perfect information, it would fall along the horizontal red line.  All 
auctions would have the same outcome.  With risk aversion, participants will bid closer to 
the diagonal/stair step.  The real bidding should fall somewhere between the red and blue 
line, as depicted by the green line.   
 
2. Reverse Auction Theory 
In the reverse English auction, there are many sellers and only one buyer.  
Reverse auction reservation price is the lowest price a bidder is willing to take for the 
item or service and reserve price is the highest price the buyer is willing to pay for the 
item or service.  The buyer will continue to lower the price until there is only one seller 
remaining.  The object of the reverse auction is to get the lowest price for the buyer.  Like 
the forward English auction, both the seller and buyer will perceive surplus value from 
this format.  
The Dutch reverse auction is similar to the Dutch forward auction.  The bidding 
starts well below the reservation price of any of the bidders and the first bidder wins.  The 
first person to bid will win and receive the predetermined surplus value that they 
computed with the information they had.  The seller will get surplus value as long as the 
winning bid is lower than their reserve price.   
 First price sealed bid reverse auctions are run the same way as forward first price 
sealed bid auctions.  The exception is that reverse auctions take the lowest bidder.  This is 
one of the ways in which the Navy does its contract bidding.  The contractors will all be 
given the same information from which to create their bids and they have a specific time 
period to submit bids; the lowest bidder will win the contract.   
Second price, sealed bid, reverse auctions try to take out the guessing factor that 
goes into the first price auctions.  Most people involved in first price auctions don’t want 
to bid at their reservation price.  They receive no extra value from bidding in that manner.  
With the second price auction, they can bid at their reservation price and know that if 
they win, they will still receive some surplus value as they will receive the second lowest 
bidder’s price, not their own.  
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3. Auction Design 
When discussing auction design the first question is what are the goals of the 
auction?  Auction designs are chosen based on their efficiency, effectiveness, equity and 
practicality.  Efficiency is achieved if the auction is designed in a manner to create the 
best value for the auctioneer.  This would mean assigning the most willing sailors to the 
less desirable billets.  Effectiveness means that the Navy is paying the minimum price to 
fill all of the less desirable billets.  Equity has two meanings; people going to the same 
less desirable location are getting the same pay is one way to view equity and the other is 
that people going to the same less desirable location are getting the same surplus value.  
The second meaning is the one economists use to view auctions and is the one in which 
this format should be viewed.  Practicality is the question of weather the auction format 
will work in the real world.   
Looking at the circumstances under which the auction would take place, the 
English and Dutch style auctions are not practical.  The potential bidders are all over the 
globe and it would be nearly impossible to conduct an auction that requires all 
participants to be present simultaneously, even by getting them all in one chat room at the 
same time.  Without guaranteeing that every interested party could participate, these 
auction formats would not be feasible.   
The second price sealed bid auction would probably be good, but would require 
some auction education throughout the Navy.  This format is not familiar to all people 
and may confuse them enough to not participate.  The bidders might receive more surplus 
from this auction style, but the Navy would have higher costs, not just in the amount paid 
to the bidders but in the education and training costs associated with the auction format.  
This format would most likely not be as effective due to the lack of participation.  
The first price sealed bid auction is the easiest to implement.  The format is very 
understandable to all participants.  The fact that there is a time frame in which to submit 
bids allows all interested parties to participate.  The bidders understand that if they win 
they get what they bid.  This format is simple and straight forward.  This format is the 
best fit given all the criteria.  Figure 1 shows the First price sealed bid is the best choice.  
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Figure 2 is set up as a red light chart.  Green means the system is optimal for the 
category, yellow means it will produce good result for the category and red means it is 
not designed for this category.  The AIP system is set up the same way and is working 
well.  
 








(Ascending)      
English 
(Descending)      
First-Price 
Sealed Bid      
Second-Price 
Sealed Bid      
Figure 2.   Auction Format Considerations8 
    
B. CURRENT ASSIGNMENT INCENTIVE PAY PROGRAM 
1. Assignment Incentive Pay Program Goals 
Type 3 duty is, “duty performed in a land-based activity, which does not require 
members to be absent more than 150 days per year, but is credited as sea duty for 
rotational purposes only due to the relative undesirability of the geographic area.”9  This 
allows sailors to go overseas, instead of to a ship for sea duty.  Sea duty credit has been 
used to attract personnel to overseas billets that otherwise would be difficult to fill.  The 
Navy did not want to slam people into these jobs.  The assignment incentive program was 
set up to convert overseas type 3 to type 6 duty.  Type 6 duty is, “duty performed in 
                                                 
8 Coughlan, P., Dizon, R. and Gates, B. “Analysis of Separation Pay Options (Brief)” p. 18   
9 MILPERSMAN 1306-102, BUPERS Web Site 
“buperscd.technology.navy.mil/bup_updt/508/milpers/1306-102.htm” p. 1  20 Oct, 2005 
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overseas land-based activities, which are credited as shore duty for rotational purposes.  
Members are not required to be absent from corporate limits of their duty station in 
excess of 150 days per year.”10  By changing these billets, the Navy could get volunteers 
to fill the overseas shore duty billets without counting the billets as sea duty and would 
save money in the process.    
“Assignment Incentive Pay has been initiated to ‘balance the playing field’ and 
attempt to make all assignments desirable to at least one qualified volunteer.”11  With this 
in mind, the Navy set up reserve prices for different locations and allowed eligible 
candidates to bid for billets based on the amount of extra money per month the person 
would require to go to the billet.  This system is set up like a reverse first price sealed bid 
auction.  Eligible sailors can bid during the normal requisition cycle.  No assignments are 
made to AIP billets during the requisition cycle.  Results are posted on the Job 
Advertising and Selection System(JASS) following selection.    
The Detailer will review all applications/bids at the end of the requisition 
cycle.  He/she will take into account all the applicants’ qualifications, 
take-up month of the job, NEC reutilization, cost relative to other 
applicants for a particular job (including PCS costs and AIP total costs), 
and make a selection based on all factors.  The general guidance is that the 
qualified member with the lowest bid will be selected.  In cases where the 
Detailer feels there is a compelling reason not to follow these guidelines, 
he/she will be required to obtain Branch Head approval.12   
2. Assignment Incentive Pay in Action 
Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) first started in June of 2003.  Currently, 111 
units have been changed from type 3 to type 6 duty.  “AIP has been very successful.  
Since the pilot program began last June, more than 1,100 AIP bids have been processed, 
resulting in 238 sailors receiving an average of $245 extra pay each month.”13  In 
November of 2003, the USS EMORY S. LAND in La Maddalina and the USS FRANK 
                                                 
10 MILPERSMAN 1306-102, BUPERS Web Site 
“buperscd.technology.navy.mil/bup_updt/508/milpers/1306-102.htm” p. 1 
11 NPC Web Site “Assignment Incentive Pay – Business Rules.” p. 1 
12 NPC Web Site “Assignment Incentive Pay – Business Rules.” p. 3 
13 CNO, “Force Shaping—Assignment Incentive Pay Expansion and Reclassification of Enlisted Type 
3 Duty for Commands in Guam.” p. 1 
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CABLE in Guam were added to the AIP system.  In Jan of 2005, some rating billets 
onboard the USS KITTY HAWK in Yokosuka, Japan were added to AIP.  AIP is already 
being used in overseas sea duty location incentive situations.  
The AIP system has proven capable of producing volunteers for less desirable 
billets.  All billets are not created equal and the AIP system allows for a flexible incentive 
plan to augment the desirability of billets with increased monetary compensation.  The 
flexibility of this system allows the Navy to produce one volunteer for every billet at the 
lowest possible price.  As long as each billet has at least one qualified bidder, the system 
will be effective.  
 
C. SEA DUTY LOCATION ASSIGNMENT INCENTIVE PAY METHODS 
1.  Sea Duty Location Assignment Incentive Pay (SDLAIP)  
The system could be set up in many ways.  There are two ways to bid on sea pay, 
one is to bid as a percent of sea pay and the other is to bid a dollar amount.  Both systems 
would normally be set up to bid more than the normal amount of sea pay for less 
desirable locations;  however, these systems could also be set up to bid less than a 
person’s current sea pay for the more desirable billet locations.  The bid increments could 
also be controlled; in the current AIP system, bids are collected in 50 dollar increments.  
This creates a step distribution.  A step distribution could be set up with the percent of sea 
pay method by limiting bids to percent increments.  Alternatively, bids could be set up to 
provide a continuous distribution by allowing bids of any dollar or percent increment.  
Figure 3 shows the step, continuous and straight sea pay method comparisons for one 
location with positive bids only.   
The straight sea pay method requires that 200 dollars be paid to all sailors in the 
location to attract the marginal sailor and is depicted by the horizontal red line.  This 
assumes that the marginal price is known and this will not create too many or too few 
volunteers for the location.  The diagonal blue line is what sailors must receive to accept 
the billets.  The area below this line is the minimum DoD must pay to get enough 
volunteers.  The area between these two lines is the amount DoD can save if they find a 
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way to “price discriminate” and pay the reservation prices.  The stair step shows what the 
Navy loses if they don’t fine tune and only allow bidding increments.  







0.33% 0.67% 1.00% 1.33%





    
Figure 3.   Step vs. Continuous vs. Straight Sea Pay For One Location 
Red line = Equal Pay for All sailors Blue line = Continuous Light Blue = Step 
 
The system designs shown in this project fit the two extremes of the possible 
designs.  The Sea Duty Location Assignment Incentive Pay – Lump Sum (SDLAIP-LS) 
method is set up as a step system with only positive dollar amounts in steps of 50 dollar 
increments and the Sea Duty Location Assignment Incentive Pay – Percent of Sea Pay 
(SDLAIP-%) method is set up as a continuous bid from 0 percent and up of sea pay (a bid 
of less than 100 percent would reduce the member’s sea pay to obtain a desirable billet).   
These two methods are chosen to show the two extremes of the possible system design 
choices.  Figure 2 shows the SDLAIP systems as step and continuous should look 
according to the auction theory.  In real world practice it is anticipated that the 
distribution will be close to this but not necessarily the same.  
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2. Sea Duty Location Assignment Incentive Pay – Lump Sum Method 
(SDLAIP-LS) 
This method of assigning personnel to sea duty locations would offer a premium 
to the current sea pay system.  The system would be similar to the current AIP system in 
that each location would set a maximum bid and candidates would be able to bid to the 
maximum bid level on a sea duty billet in that location.  The bidders could bid only for 
the least desirable billets and only in $50 increments.  Just like the AIP system, the lowest 
bidder would win and receive orders with the extra pay that he or she bid.   
With this system, the less desirable billet locations would have to be identified 
and only those billets would be eligible for with SDLAIP-LS.  The most desirable billets 
would not be affected.  There would still be a discrepancy between the most desirable 
billets and the average billets.  This system would not balance the distribution system 
across all sea duty billets.  This would not create neutrality throughout the distribution 
system.  However, it would create a volunteer for every sea duty billet available.  
 
3. Sea Duty Location Assignment Incentive Pay - Percent of Sea Pay 
Method (SDLAIP-%) 
The system could be set up as a bid from 0 percent and up of the current sea pay 
table.  This system would allow individuals who want the more desirable sea duty 
locations to forfeit some or all of their sea pay to get the location by bidding between 0 
and 100 percent.  An individual that is trying to homestead in Mayport, FL may be 
willing to give up all of his or her sea pay in order to get orders to Mayport.  This system 
could be set up for every sea duty location in the Navy.  The added benefit is that it 
should act as an automatic balancing of the distribution system across all sea duty billets.  
This would create a neutral distribution system which would allow the Navy to know 
which locations are most and least desirable.  
This system would also have the added benefit of not letting sea pay diminish in 
its ability to keep sailors in sea duty billets.  Over the years, a set sea pay compensation 
system is diminished by inflation.  “In the late 1990s, two factors led the Navy to 
reevaluate sea pay.  First, sea pay was becoming less effective as a distribution tool.  Sea 
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pay had lost about 40 percent of its value to inflation since the last pay change.”14  The 
value of a dollar today is more than the value of a dollar tomorrow.  The percent of sea 
pay system should automatically adjust with the perceived value.  Hypothetically, the 
percentages of sea pay bid would increase as the value of money decreases.  Eventually, 
the base table would have to be adjusted up as less and less bidders are received on some 
of the most desirable billets. Otherwise, the system would self adjust with the market 
fluctuations.   
This system provides the best of both worlds, as pointed out in one article:  
Sea pay and AIP are not directly comparable, and sailors’ response to sea 
pay could be higher because of its design.  Sea Pay depends on cumulative 
years of sea duty.  Extending a sea tour today leads to higher income today 
and in the future.  Consequently, sailors are responding not only to today’s 
sea pay income but to the future stream of sea pay.  AIP, however, is a set 
monthly amount, not dependent on whether a sailor filled an undesirable 
billet previously.15  
By having sailors bid as a percent of sea pay means that sailors will be bidding on today’s 
sea pay income and future stream of sea pay.  As a location incentive, this would provide 
a volunteer for every sea duty billet and an added incentive to stay in that billet as sea pay 
increases based on total sea duty served.  A sailor would always receive the same percent 
of his or her sea pay as the sea pay adjusts to the amount of time the sailor has 
accumulated on sea duty.    
 
D. COST TO USE SDLAIP TO BALANCE SEA DUTY PREFERENCES 
1.  Cost of Sea Duty Location Assignment Incentive Pay – Lump Sum 
Method (SDLAIP-LS)  
Based on the analysis conducted for sea pay changes, the billets requiring more 
pay will be the same.  The difference is that with SDLAIP, only a small percentage of the 
billets at each location will have to be paid extra money.  For every duty location, there 
are some people who will volunteer with no extra incentive.  SDLAIP will be able to 
                                                 
14 Golding, H and McArver S “ Navy Sea Pay: History and Recent Initiatives.” p. 23 
15 Golding, H and Gregory, D  “Sailors’ Willingness to Complete Sea Tours: Does Money Matter?” p. 
37 
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capture these people at no extra cost.  It will also be able to obtain all other volunteers at 
their lowest value.   
Figure 1 shows that with this method the first .33 percent of people requiring 
extra money to take orders to the location will only be paid $50 per month extra.  If all of 
the billets for this location are still not filled, the amount should automatically adjust up 
at $50 increments for every .33 percent of personnel needed.  This allows the Navy to pay 
the minimum amount to fill each billet voluntarily.   









Everett/Bremerton, WA 6718 -0.33% $50 $179,204 
Gaeta, Italy 790 0.00%     
Guam 1266 0.00%     
Ingleside, TX 1464 -1.33% $200 $1,808,330 
La Maddalena, Italy 1266 0.00%     
Mayport, FL 7275 1.33%     
Norfolk/Little Creek, VA 37153 0.00%     
Pascagoula, MS 736 -0.33% $50 $179,204 
Pearl Harbor, HI 3010 -0.33% $50 $179,204 
San Deigo, CA 22462 2.00%     
Japan 8367 -1.00% $150 $1,084,998 
 Total 90507     $3,430,939 
 
This system assumes that the first .33 percent of billets needed can be produced 
by the first 50 dollar increment.  The rest of the billets needed to be filled will be in one 
.33 percent per 50 dollar increment.  SDLAIP is computed by multiplying the total sea 
duty billets by the percent per increment, then by the amount per increment and, finally, 
by 12 to covert cost into an annual cost.  The following equation is an example for 
Ingleside, TX.  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 330,808,1$12*90507*200$*0033.150$*0033.100$*0033.50$*0033. =+++  
The location premium for Ingleside is negative 1.3 percent.  This means that less 
people request a billet in Ingleside than the amount of billets available.  This requires a 
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SDLAIP incentive to balance the location premium.  With the estimated influence of 
monetary compensation, the cost is computed for the first 0.33 of a percent at 50 dollars, 
the second 0.33 of a percent at 100 dollars, the next 0.33 of a percent at 150 dollars and 
the last 0.33 of a percent at 200 dollars.  The estimates are then adjusted to annual 
amounts by multiplying by 12.  The final estimate is the annual cost to balance the 
available billets with the billets requested.  
 
2. Cost of Sea Duty Location Assignment Incentive Pay Percent of Sea 
Pay Method (SDLAIP-%) 
Using this system may create complications with the estimation of cost.  The first 
assumption is that it would be more cost effective than even the SDLAIP-LS.  This 
system would not only allow personnel to compete for hard to fill billets, but it would 
allow them to compete for highly desired billet locations.  When bidding from 0 to 200 
percent on all sea duty jobs, the sailors may actually create a neutral bidding system.  
This type of system may not cost the Navy any extra money at all.  However, it is less 
likely that a sailor would be willing to give up money to get a location of choice when 
there is another location available that would not require any sacrifice of money or would 
pay a premium.  The hypothetical cost is estimated in Table 7.  
There are two ways that SDLAIP-% improves cost efficiency.  By allowing 
sailors to bid for more desirable locations by forfeiting some sea pay the Navy saves 
money.  The system would also lower the overall cost of people bidding up their sea pay 
for less desired billets because they will not be locked into a step bidding system.  The 
ability to bid in percentages allows the system to be more flexible.  The system would 
become a straight line from zero dollars to whatever the maximum bid is to get the last 














Percent of Sea 
Pay 
Everett/Bremerton, WA 6718 -0.33% $50 $90,416  
Gaeta, Italy 790 0.00%     
Guam 1266 0.00%     
Ingleside, TX 1464 -1.33% $200 $904,165  
La Maddalena, Italy 1266 0.00%     
Mayport, FL 7275 1.33%   -$452,082 
Norfolk/Little Creek, VA 37153 0.00%     
Pascagoula, MS 736 -0.33% $50 $90,416  
Pearl Harbor, HI 3010 -0.33% $50 $90,416  
San Deigo, CA 22462 2.00%   -$949,373 
Japan 8367 -1.00% $150 $542,499  
 Total 90507     $316,458 
 
By adjusting and reducing the value of the incentive in the equation to half, it 
captures the average value needed by all persons in the relevant range of the step.  In the 
SDLAIP-LS system, this is a step bid of 50 dollars.  Any person that requires 51 dollars 
to take a billet will have to bid 100 dollars.  With SDLAIP-%, the person can bid a 
percent of sea pay that will increase the sea pay by 51 dollars.  In order to estimate the 
average cost per step, assume a uniform distribution per step; dividing the step cost by 
two captures the most likely cost of the SDLAIP-% method.  With this assumption, the 
previously used equation for SDLAIP-LS would be changed to the following.  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 165,904$12*90507*100$*0033.75$*0033.50$*0033.25$*0033. =+++  
For the most desirable billets, the amount of money that would be forfeited is 
estimated to be less than the amount people are willing to accept for less desirable billets.  
The thinking is that half as many people would be willing to forfeit money to get the 
location of choice.  Hence, the following equation pertains to Mayport, FL.  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 082,452$2/12*90507*100$*0033.75$*0033.50$*0033.25$*0033. −=−+++  
 The equation is similar to the one for Ingleside.  The equation is changed to make 
it negative by multiplying by a negative 12 to convert to an annual amount.  The equation 
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is then divided by two in order to account for the assumption that half as many people 
would forfeit money to get choice orders as would be willing to receive extra money to 
receive less desirable orders.  This is a cost benefit to the Navy.  By allowing some 
sailors to forfeit money to compete for the most desirable billets the Navy can offset the 
cost of assigning people to the less desired billets.  The overall outcome is a cost lower 






IV. COST COMPARISONS AND ESTIMATED SAVINGS 
A. RETENTION COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH INVOLUNTARY 
ASSIGNMENT 
In a study conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses, the retention costs for 
involuntary assignment to shore duty locations were computed.  For the purposes of this 
paper, adjustments were made for the number of total applicable billets.  Otherwise, all 
other calculations are the same.  The study looked at the required Selected Reenlistment 
Bonuses (SRB) needed to offset the drop in retention of people sent involuntarily to 
billets.  The number of billets considered in the study for scenario 1 and 3 was 28,850 
and for scenarios 2 and 4 was 34,500.  Scenarios 2 and 4 include overseas type 3 billets.  
The number of billets for this study is 90,507.  The data from the study is a straight ratio 
based on the number of billets available.  The following table is the adjusted data from 
the CNA study.   
 
Table 8.   Cost of Involuntary Assignment16 
 SRB cost to alleviate retention effect  
Cost scenario Initial enlistee Careerist Total 
1:  Least preferred locations 
(CONUS shore duty) 
0 $24,200,000 $24,200,000 
2:  Least preferred locations 
(all duty types) 
$9,400,000 $28,100,000 $37,500,000 
3:  Involuntary assignment 
(CONUS shore duty) 
$42,700,000 $25,700,000 $68,400,000 
4:  Involuntary assignment 
(all duty types) 
$64,500,000 $38,000,000 $102,600,000 
                                                 
16  Christensen, Eric, Golding, Heidi and Houck, Lynda.  “Hard-to-Fill Billets, Individual Assignment 
Preferences, and Continuation.”  p. 40 
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Scenario 1 calculates retention costs of sailors ordered to the least preferred 
CONUS locations.  Scenario 2 calculates retention costs of sailors ordered to the least 
preferred CONUS locations plus the type 3 overseas shore duty locations.  Scenarios 3 
and 4 are the same as scenarios 1 and 2 respectively, except they assume that all sailors 
selected for billets at 6 months are getting assignments that they do not prefer to have.  
Essentially, the number of involuntarily assigned personnel has gone up drastically in 
scenario 3 and 4.17 
This table provides an estimate of what it would cost to eliminate retention 
reductions due to involuntary assignment.  Using this data as a starting point, all other 
costs will be compared and assessed.  Each of the assignment systems in this study would 
produce a volunteer for every available billet.  With the implementation of any of these 
systems, there would be no involuntary assignment, eliminating the reduction in 
retention.   
The study has four sections, least preferred locations (CONUS shore duty), least 
preferred locations (all duty types), involuntary assignment (CONUS shore duty), and 
involuntary assignment (all duty types).  The involuntary assignment (all duty types) is 
the most applicable section for use with this study.  The costs associated with this section 
will represent the savings from producing at least one volunteer for every available billet 
in the less desirable sea duty locations.  
 
B. TOTAL SAVINGS FROM ALL INCENTIVE PAY SYSTEMS 
 1. Savings from Location Sea Pay 
Estimated savings will be based on scenario 2 numbers.  This scenario best 
mirrors the sea duty locations available in this study.  Scenario 4 over estimates the 
number of people receiving orders they do not prefer.   
The cost of adjusting sea pay is estimated to be approximately $24.9 million.  The 
estimated savings would be approximately $37.5 - $24.9 = $12.6. million. This scenario 
                                                 
17 Christensen, Eric, Golding, Heidi and Houck, Lynda.  “Hard-to-Fill Billets, Individual Assignment 
Preferences, and Continuation.”  p. 39-41 
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predicts that retention will be the same for preferred billets as for the less desirable billets 
after all billets are filled with volunteers.  This may not be the true outcome of the 
change.  
There is a savings from adjusting sea pay to create volunteers for every sea duty 
assignment.  This savings is based on a study that shows sailors who volunteer for 
assignments will have higher retention.  Increased retention produces savings through 
reduced recruiting demands, reduced training of new personnel and eliminates out 
processing of personnel leaving the Navy.   
 
2. Savings from SDLAIP-LS 
The SDLAIP costs are estimated to be approximately $3.4 million if sailors bid 
their reservation price. This would create a net savings of approximately $33.1 million.  
The savings is larger than that of the location sea pay system.  SDLAIP can produce 
volunteers more efficiently than the location sea pay system.  The retention savings are 
the same.  The cost of the incentive system is where SDLAIP has the advantage over 
location sea pay.  
 
3.  Savings from SDLAIP-%  
The cost of the SDLAIP-% is approximately $0.3 million again if sailors bid their 
reservation price.  This produces a net savings of approximately $37.2 million.  This is 
$24.6 million better than the location sea pay system and $3.1 million better than the 
SDLAIP-LS system.  Hypothetically, this is the most efficient system design.  This 
system produces its savings from eliminating the step bidding system of the two former 
systems and allowing people to compete for the most desirable billets by forfeiting all or 
part of their sea pay.   
This is obviously the most economical of all of the systems.  The problem is that 
this is hypothetical.  No research has been conducted on how people would react to 
paying for a preferred billet.  They may not be willing to pay anything for any billet.  The 
Navy's ability to institute a system similar to this is also an issue.  The current pay system 
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is not very flexible and may not be able to handle computing sea pay as a percent for 
multiple people.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
A. CONCLUSION  
SDLAIP is the most efficient means to get at least one volunteer for every sea 
duty billet.  The current AIP system proves that people will select a less desirable 
location in order to make more money.  This provides evidence that people can be 
influenced to choose orders based on monetary incentives.   
The estimate that .33 of a percent of all sailors could be influenced to change 
homeport selection based on a $50 a month increase in sea pay is based on results for 
extending sea duty; this may or may not hold for sea duty location preferences.  This 
estimate was used to illustrate the effectiveness of the system.  Keeping this assumption 
the same for Location Sea Pay, SDLAIP-LS and SDLAIP-% allows for a fair 
comparison.  The SDLAIP-% provided the most cost effective means to capture a 
volunteer for every billet.   The AIP concept can be applied to this situation.  
The fact that people will react to monetary compensation is clear.  The amount of 
monetary compensation is in question.  Each person has a different utility level for 
money and location desired.  These differences can be readily adjusted with SDLAIP and 
cannot be readily adjusted with direct changes to sea pay by location.  Not only is 
Location Sea Pay inflexible, but there is no way to know the amount of pay required to 
capture a volunteer for every billet.  The system could under or over value the billets and 
create an imbalance.  This system would not work because once a price is set for a 
location it would be very hard to change.   
 
B. RECOMMENDATION 
Design a SDLAIP-LS system for all hard to fill sea duty billets.  Base the research 
for this system on the AIP billets onboard the USS KITTY HAWK; USS EMORY 
LAND; and the USS FRANK CABLE.  These ships can provide information on how the 
current system is working for sea duty.   This would be the quickest way to implement a 
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location sea pay system.  The sailors are familiar with the system and would easily accept 
this type of system.  
 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further research is recommended prior to trying to implement a system for the 
most desired locations.  There is no data currently available to indicate that sailors would 
be willing to give up sea pay to receive orders to a more desirable billet location.  This 
would require some research to establish limits and thresholds.  The impact on retention 
and morale would have to be analyzed.  During the course of this research no data has 
been found to imply that the Navy has ever asked people to give up money to receive 
their location of choice.  This would seem to be a whole new area to research.  
The cost savings analysis would need to be reworked with real data for retention 
of individuals involuntarily assigned to sea duty billets.  The data used from the shore 
duty research should be close but may not be perfectly accurate.  Due to the arduous 
nature of sea duty the savings may be more when sea duty data is used.  
Duty location preference data could be better acquired by submitting a Navy wide 
survey.  A survey would be the best way to determine duty preferences and the required 
monetary compensation to change those preferences.  A survey would be the best way to 
get both monetary levels of compensation for less desirable locations and forfeit of pay to 
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